States Should Consider Partial Wealth Tax Reforms by Gamage, David & Shanske, Darien
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University 
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law 
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship 
5-18-2020 
States Should Consider Partial Wealth Tax Reforms 
David Gamage 
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, dgamage@indiana.edu 
Darien Shanske 
University of California, Davis, dshanske@ucdavis.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, Taxation-State and Local 
Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gamage, David and Shanske, Darien, "States Should Consider Partial Wealth Tax Reforms" (2020). Articles 
by Maurer Faculty. 2890. 
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2890 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by 
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital 
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please 
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu. 
TAX NOTES STATE, MAY 18, 2020 859
tax notes state
ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
States Should Consider Partial Wealth Tax Reforms
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
The COVID-19 pandemic is precipitating 
severe fiscal crises for states and localities.1 This is 
occurring as businesses throughout the country 
have shut down, unemployment numbers have 
skyrocketed, and consumer demand has dropped 
significantly. The national economy is likely 
headed for a deep economic recession, and state 
and local governments are ill-equipped to deal 
with the fiscal volatility problem that caused 
budget crises during past recessions, including 
the Great Recession of 2008.2
This article is a contribution to Project SAFE 
(State Action in Fiscal Emergencies).3 In other 
essays in this project, we explain steps the federal 
government should take to help state and local 
governments cope with their looming budget 
crises. The federal government is much better 
positioned to manage these crises than states and 
localities and, ideally, it would act sufficiently to 
prevent the need for state and local governments 
to cut spending or raise taxes. However, we fear 
that the federal government may fail to act 
sufficiently, leaving states and localities with the 
need to make painful spending cuts, raise taxes, or 
both. Here, we make some suggestions for how 
states should respond if the federal government 
fails to act sufficiently.
Specifically, we argue that the states should 
consider adopting partial wealth tax reforms, at 
least temporarily, to raise needed revenue to 
weather the budget crises. There are at least two 
promising options that could be designed and 
implemented sufficiently quickly (at least in some 
states) to make good policy responses to the crises.
But first, some more background information. 
States are subject to balanced-budget constraints 
that prevent them from engaging in deficit 
spending during economic downturns, whereas 
the federal government is not so constrained.4 
During economic downturns, state tax revenues 
tend to fall sharply, and as such, states can 
maintain balanced budgets only by increasing 
taxes (and perhaps licensing fees), cutting 
spending, or both. Conversely, during the 
economic upturns that lead to tax revenue 
surpluses, states typically reduce taxes and 
increase spending. In particular, social insurance 
programs such as Medicaid are subject to 
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In this installment of Academic Perspectives 
on SALT, the authors argue that, if the federal 
government fails to act sufficiently regarding the 
COVID-19 budget crisis, states should consider 
either real property surtaxes on their wealthiest 
residents or partial deemed realization of the 
unrealized capital gains of the very wealthy.
1
See Gladriel Shobe et al., “Introducing Project SAFE (State Action in 
Fiscal Emergencies),” Tax Notes State, Apr. 27, 2020, p. 471.
2
See David Gamage, “Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the 
Fiscal Volatility Problem,” 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749 (2010).
3
Shobe et al., supra note 1.
4
Gamage, supra note 2.
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spending cuts during economic downturns — 
when they are needed most. The COVID-19 crisis 
especially highlights the perils of spending cuts as 
Medicaid, unemployment insurance, and other 
social insurance programs that are vital to 
millions now out of work. So the question 
remains: How can states and localities better 
contend with fiscal volatility, especially in the face 
of a looming budgetary crisis?
Ultimately, raising taxes is preferable to 
harmful spending cuts to cope with budget crises 
during an economic downturn.5 Ideally, tax 
increases should be targeted at economic actors 
who are better positioned to weather the 
economic downturn, and with the increases made 
in a way that minimizes the potential for tax 
gaming responses or other taxpayer maneuvers 
for escaping tax.
Absent administrative constraints, the best 
solution would be a one-time wealth tax on state 
residents — which is backward-looking in that it 
taxes wealth accumulated previously. Hence, it is 
less subject to tax-gaming and other detrimental 
taxpayer responses. Such a wealth tax should be 
designed with a large exemption, so that the tax 
would only apply to the wealthiest, who are 
generally better positioned to weather the 
downturn as compared with others — especially 
the beneficiaries of major state spending 
programs.6
Of course, administrative constraints 
complicate this story. States do not currently have 
a general wealth tax, nor is it likely to be feasible 
for them to design and implement a major new 
tax quickly enough to offset upcoming budget 
shortfalls. Moreover, some states face legal 
prohibitions against general taxes on wealth; for 
instance, article XVI, section 3, of the New York 
State Constitution states that:
Intangible personal property shall not be 
taxed ad valorem nor shall any excise tax 
be levied solely because of the ownership 
or possession thereof, except that the 
income therefrom may be taken into 
consideration in computing any excise tax 
measured by income generally.
Thus, because such a large share of wealth 
consists of intangible personal property (chiefly in 
the form of financial assets such as stocks and 
bonds), any meaningful New York wealth tax 
would likely require a constitutional amendment.
Nevertheless, these barriers leave open at least 
two promising reform options. The first would be 
a new statewide real property tax with a large 
exemption level (or circuit-breaker) so that only 
the wealthiest residents or businesses would be 
subject to it. Such a new tax (or surtax) could 
piggyback on the existing administrative 
valuations for real property taxes, and thus could 
be designed and implemented quickly. Needless 
to say, this would only be a quick option in states 
without constitutional limits on property tax rates 
or with other legal and administrative barriers. In 
any case, this proposal could be designed and 
implemented as a temporary measure, meant for 
raising the revenue needed to weather the 
economic downturn.
The second option would be a new tax or 
deemed realization measure on the stock of 
unrealized capital gains. This could be done in 
several possible ways. For instance, the new tax 
could consist of a deemed realization of a 
percentage (for example, 50 percent) of unrealized 
gains that would then immediately be taxed at the 
state’s income tax rates, with an exemption so that 
this new levy would only apply to the wealthiest 
taxpayers. This option would be more difficult to 
design and implement and would likely need to 
rely substantially on self-reported appraisals — 
backed by auditing and penalties — for valuation 
purposes. But the revenue potential should still be 
reasonably large, and because so much wealth is 
constituted by publicly traded securities, neither 
self-assessment nor auditing ought to be 
prohibitively onerous.7
By taxing these unrealized gains now, states 
would in effect be accelerating what would 
otherwise have been future tax payments (at least 
in theory, as in practice much of unrealized gains 
5
For elaboration as to why, see Gamage, supra note 2.
6
Daniel Markovits has made a similar proposal at the federal level: 
see “A Wealth Tax Is the Logical Way to Support Coronavirus Relief,” The 
New York Times, Apr. 21, 2020.
7
Mark Gergen estimates that 73 percent of the total value of income-
producing assets are publicly traded securities. Gergen, “How to Tax 
Capital,” 70 Tax L. Rev. 1, 22 (2016).
©
 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
For more Tax Notes® State content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
 
Electr nic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3633474
ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
TAX NOTES STATE, MAY 18, 2020  861
are never realized or recognized because of 
provisions like stepped-up basis upon death). 
This is appropriate, because the effect of taxing 
unrealized gains now — during the downturn — 
would be to at least partially counteract the fiscal 
volatility roller coaster by moving revenues to 
when they are needed most. In a sense, then, one 
might think of the current nontaxation of 
unrealized capital gains as a sort of emergency 
rainy day fund that the states should now tap.
It could be argued that either of these partial 
wealth tax reform proposals (that we explained 
above) could cause liquidity problems, even for 
the wealthy. Therefore, as a matter of design, the 
tax could permit a payment schedule, much like 
the deemed repatriation in the Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act.8 Note that such a schedule should contain a 
reasonable interest rate because states should 
consider then borrowing against this stream of 
income to pay for immediate needs.
Another possible objection to a tax of either 
type is that the wealthy might simply leave the 
state. There is significant economics literature on 
these issues.9 We read this literature as implying 
that migrations from so-called high tax states 
have so far10 not represented a phenomenon that 
should overly trouble states considering more 
progressive taxation. But however one reads the 
literature as to ongoing income taxes, our 
proposed tax measures would be a one-time tax 
on previously accumulated wealth or gains. Thus, 
there should be a minimal behavioral response.
And the argument for those taxes runs deeper 
than that they would be broadly progressive and 
efficient. Consider that income and wealth 
inequality have become increasingly pressing 
issues at both the federal and state levels. 
Accordingly, recent Pew Research Center polling 
reveals that six in 10 U.S. adults believe there is 
too much inequality in the country today, and 84 
percent of those who see inequality as a problem 
believe that the government should increase taxes 
on the wealthy. Yet states and the federal 
government do a very poor job of taxing the true 
economic income of the very wealthy.11 For the top 
0.1 percent of taxpayers and above, whose 
incomes derive primarily from the returns to 
owning wealth (rather than from salary or wages), 
structural features of state and federal income 
taxes make these taxes “so porous as to be largely 
symbolic.”12
In that light, either option — a new statewide 
property surtax on the very wealthy or a new 
statewide tax on the unrealized capital gains of 
the wealthy — would help ameliorate the lack of 
effective taxation of the very rich in the years and 
decades leading up to the current and looming 
economic downturn. This would have been a 
good reason to impose these taxes even before the 
pandemic. During a pandemic and recession, 
these tax reform proposals are thus even more 
clearly a good idea. Remember, assuming the 
federal government fails to act, there is a zero-sum 
game here. Either states and localities must cut 
vital services and thereby prolong the recession — 
or else avert these cuts by raising tax revenues.
Given the scale of the emergency and the 
importance of the states not eating their seed corn 
by engaging in overly destructive cuts, it may 
ultimately become necessary for them to consider 
revenue instruments that are far less from ideal 
(for example, gross receipts taxes). But before 
contemplating such measures, states should start 
with more targeted and better designed policy 
options. In that light, we view our proposals for 
real property surtaxes on the wealthiest or partial 
deemed realization of the unrealized capital gains 




Cristobal Young et al., “Millionaire Migration and Taxation of the 
Elite: Evidence from Administrative Data,” 81(3) American Sociological 
Review 421-446 (2016); Joshua Rauh and Ryan J. Shyu, “Behavioral 
Responses to State Income Taxation of High Earners: Evidence from 
California,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 
26349 (Oct. 2019).
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For example, we are not considering what would happen if states 
imposed much higher tax rates than they currently do.
11
See Gamage, “Five Key Research Findings on Wealth Taxation for 
the Super Rich” (July 27, 2019).
12
Id. (citing Edward J. McCaffery, “The Death of the Income Tax (Or, 
The Rise of America’s Universal Wage Tax),” Center for Law and Social 
Science Research, Papers Series No. 18-25, at 2 (Aug. 31, 2018)).
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